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I. INTRODUCTION

Several recent events harmonically converged into the topic for
this article. The first was a posting on Georgetown Law’s environmental law professors’ listserv by Professor John Bonine, which
raised a number of questions about whether and how standing doctrine might be rethought in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA.1 That opinion relaxed the states’ standing
burden because of the unique sovereign interests, finding that federalism bargaining earned states “special solicitude”2 when it
came to meeting the Court’s standing requirements.

*
Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and Director of the Institute for Public Representation. The author is grateful to the faculty at Florida State University College of Law for inviting me to present these ideas at their annual Journal of
Land Use & Environmental Law Distinguished Lecturer Series and for their insightful
comments on my lecture. I am also indebted to Jamie G. Pleune, a graduate teaching fellow
and staff attorney at the Institute for Representation, for her wise comments on an earlier
draft of this article and to Angela Navarro for her careful edits. The lecture has been revised slightly since it was delivered in February of this year to reflect the fact that it is now
appearing in written, not spoken form. It has also been updated to incorporate the FSU
faculty comments as well as the effect of a recent U.S. Supreme Court standing decision,
Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (2009).
1. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
2. Id. at 520 (“[M]assachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests . . .
entitled [it] to special solicitude in our standing analysis.”).
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The second was a complaint filed by a consortium of regional
environmental organizations, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,
and individuals against the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for failing to achieve the goals of the Chesapeake Bay
Agreements.3 EPA is one of five signatories to the Agreements,
which contains a variety of goals, deadlines, and recommended actions, and which has failed miserably to halt the Chesapeake Bay’s
decline.4 This complaint led to a reflection on work done in the
clinic several years ago, where bringing a lawsuit on behalf of a
commercial fisherman challenging the practice of chumming on
the Bay was thought about long and hard. Chumming involves depositing a slurry of decomposed fish parts, usually menhaden, over
the side of a fishing boat to attract game fish like striped bass.5
While chumming contributes to the Bay’s nutrification, by itself it
has little discernible impact on the Bay’s overall health given the
much larger sources of nutrients like sewage treatment plants, runoff from farm fields, and confined animal feeding operations.6 Ultimately it was determined, in part on standing grounds, that such
a lawsuit could not succeed.
The last event was a recent conversation with a retired Washington attorney about his decision to start a new organization that
would supply pro bono assistance to property owners concerned
about relatively discrete, highly localized harms to the Bay such as
leaking septic systems or permit violations by industrial dischargers. Collectively, these separate events congealed into a somewhat
amorphous concern about the extent to which the Supreme Court’s
standing jurisprudence and its insistence on a showing of a particularized injury-in-fact are ill-suited to the types of broad-based,
generalized harms from which complex, constantly changing ecosystems suffer.
The new lawsuit against EPA mentioned above, as well as the
contemplated, but never filed, chumming lawsuit, would likely fail
to meet current standing requirements because plaintiffs would be
unable to disaggregate the harm they suffered from the more generalized harms that the public suffers as a result of the Bay’s de3. Complaint at 2, Fowler v. EPA, No. 1:2009CV00005 (D.D.C. Jan. 5, 2009).
4. See Jeff Day, Chesapeake Bay: Bay’s Health Remains Poor After 25 Years; Officials
Say ‘Bolder’ Initiatives Under Way, 40 ENV’T REP. 707, 707 (Mar. 27, 2009) (reporting that
25 years after the creation of the Chesapeake Bay Program, the percentage of dissolved
oxygen in the water, which is a key indicator of the health of the Bay, is virtually unchanged from what it was in 1985).
5. For more information on the practice of chumming and its adverse effects on water quality, see generally Hope M. Babcock, Administering the Clean Water Act: Do Regulators Have “Bigger Fish to Fry” When it Comes to Addressing the Practice of Chumming on
the Chesapeake Bay?, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007).
6. Id.
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cline. While the approach of the well-meaning, retired Washington
attorney is less problematic from a standing perspective, his ability to address the larger systemic problems facing the Bay is unclear. Collectively, the three events resulted in a new thought
about how the Court’s standing jurisprudence has driven environmental litigation to a less effective piecemeal approach to protecting complex natural systems like estuaries.
Far from being an enabler of what leads to critically important
environmental litigation, the Court’s requirement that litigants
show a particularized injury can derail this litigation before the
merits of such claims can even be considered.7 The requirement
can drive both plaintiffs’ attorneys and judges into paroxysms of
tangential work often with contradictory outcomes. And while
there is much to praise about the Court’s standing analysis in
Massachusetts, it did not eliminate the need for the Commonwealth to show it had suffered a particularized injury from both
the government’s failure to attend to the potentially catastrophic
harms and from the government’s failure to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from tailpipes.8 The Court’s failure to eliminate
that need is a great disappointment in what is otherwise a
glorious opinion.
This article will attempt to persuade the reader that the
Court’s insistence that claimants demonstrate a particularized injury does not make sense, even in Massachusetts. This is evident
considering the claims that arise from broad-based harms to complex, evolving natural systems like estuaries, where the level of
understanding about how these systems behave is in as much flux
as the systems themselves.
The first part of the article describes why it is especially difficult to particularize the harms to these systems, and why lawsuits
attacking these problems in a particularized or localist way are not
doing enough to solve them. The author discusses the Court’s current standing jurisprudence, especially the requirement that a
plaintiff’s injury not only be concrete, but must also be particula7. The Court’s recent 5-4 decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S.Ct.
1142 (2009), carries on this tradition. The Court held that environmental organizations who
had sued the Forest Service for applying its regulations to exempt salvage timber sales on
238 acres of fire-damaged federal lands from the notice, comment, and appeal process set
out in the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1612, had
failed to establish a sufficiently particularized injury to make a facial challenge to the regulations absent their concrete application. Id. at 1147-48, 1149-50.
8. See generally Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1701, 1747 (2008) (expressing concern about the ambiguity in the majority’s opinion
on the extent to which Massachusetts could meet traditional standing requirements and
the extent to which those requirements were modified to reflect the state’s special
sovereign status).
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rized, in Part II of the article. Part of that discussion includes a
recitation of the reasons why the Court can, and should, relax the
requirement to plead particularized injuries from harms for these
critically important natural systems. The article ends with a description of some limiting principles to cabin the number and type
of cases that might be brought under a more relaxed injury-in-fact
standard. The application of these principles will likely leave the
Court’s overall standing doctrine intact.
II. WHY DEMONSTRATING PARTICULARIZED HARMS TO COMPLEX,
EVOLVING NATURAL SYSTEMS IS DIFFICULT AND RESULTS IN
INEFFECTIVE LAWSUITS
The physically complex and constantly changing nature of ecosystems, like estuaries, and the breadth of the systemic harms afflicting them make it extremely difficult for environmental plaintiffs to articulate an injury-in-fact that meets the Court’s particularization standard and, at the same time, addresses these problems. When plaintiffs can meet the particularization standard,
their lawsuit will have little effect on broad systemic problems.
The Chesapeake Bay is used as the platform for this argument because it is the estuary known best by the author.
The Chesapeake Bay is North America's largest estuary, consisting of 2,500 square miles.9 Its 64,000 square mile drainage area
includes all or parts of six states and the District of Columbia.10
Approximately sixteen million people live in the Bay’s watershed,
many of whom rely on the Bay and its tributaries as a source of
income and as a place to recreate and enjoy the natural environment.11 The Bay is home to more than 3,700 species of plants and
animals, including nearly 300 species of fish.12 It offers unique
commercial and recreational opportunities; prime among these
is fishing.

9. The Chesapeake Bay Program calculates that the size of the drainage area creates
“a watershed land to Bay water volume ratio seven times that of any other major estuary in
the world[.]” Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2005 Health and Restoration Assessment, Part One: Ecosystem Health 3 (2005), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
content/publications/cbp_12892.pdf. It is also the longest estuary in the country, with 4000
miles of shoreline; longer even than the “entire West Coast.” CHRISTOPHER P. WHITE, CHESAPEAKE BAY: NATURE OF THE ESTUARY: A FIELD GUIDE 3 (1989).
10. Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake Bay 2006 Health and Restoration Assessment, Part One: Ecosystem Health 11 (2006), available at http://archive.chesapeakebay.net/
pubs/2007reports/EPA06_BAYHealthReport.pdf.
11. Chesapeake Bay Program: A Watershed Partnership, Facts & Figures,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/factsandfigures.aspx?menuitem=14582 (last visited Mar.
15, 2010).
12. White, supra note 9, at 24.
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However, despite the investment of millions of dollars in improving the Bay's water quality, the Bay continues to suffer from
severe environmental degradation. For example, blue crabs, an
iconic symbol of the Chesapeake Bay, were once at the apex of the
Bay’s commercial fishery and supplied one-third of the nation’s
blue crab harvest.13 In slightly less than a decade, the total abundance of crabs in the Bay has declined nearly seventy percent..14
The Bay’s equally important oyster population is at less than 1% of
its historic numbers.15 Poor water quality from onshore sources of
nutrients and sediments has been a major factor in the decline of
these and other Bay fisheries, as well as in the loss of vital Bay
underwater grasses.16 These grasses serve as critically important
nursery and spawning areas for many of the Bay’s aquatic species
and help oxygenate the water so those and other species
can survive.17
The Bay offers a challenging environment for its resident species as well as for scientists and regulators charged with the task
of predicting how the system will respond to pollutants and other
stressors, including natural ones. The Bay’s hydrology and hydrodynamic character are extremely complex18 and poorly understood.
Although the Bay’s wide mouth allows for vigorous tidal flushing,
turnover of its water is slow; a parcel of water generally takes from
two to three weeks to cycle along the Bay's 195-mile length.19
One hundred and fifty tributaries from a wide array of geophysical provinces and states drain into the Bay, contributing not
only freshwater, nutrients, and other important materials for
plant growth, but also pollutants.20 The tributaries create a multiplicity of distinct ecological zones in the Bay, and the Bay’s temperature fluctuations and sharp salinity gradient create barriers
13. Chesapeake Bay Program: A Watershed Partnership, Blue Crab, http://www.chesa
peakebay.net/bluecrab.aspx?menuitem=19367 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
14. Chesapeake Bay Program, Blue Crab Harvest, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/
crabs.aspx?menuitem=14700 (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
15. NOAA Chesapeake Bay Office, Native Oysters, http://chesapeakebay.noaa.gov/
NativeOysters.aspx (Feb. 29, 2008).
16. See U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA NEEDS TO BETTER REPORT
CHESAPEAKE BAY CHALLENGES, SUMMARY REPORT, REP. NO. 08-P-0199 30 (2008) (discussing the onshore sources of nutrients and sediments and their impact on Chesapeake Bay
water quality).
17. White, supra note 9, at 24 (explaining that “[l]ike a pyramid of stones, the animals
at the top are dependent on the size of the plant base. Top carnivores such as crabs, bluefish, and osprey are very abundant in the Chesapeake only because of the enormous plant
productivity in the Bay . . . . The Bay’s various plant communities . . . sustain the nations’
most prolific estuarine fisheries.”).
18. V.N. Mikhailov et al., Regularities of Hydrological Processes in the Chesapeake
Bay (USA): Case Study of a Classical Estuary, 36 WATER RES. 127, 127 (2009).
19. White, supra note 9, at 18.
20. Id. at 19-20.
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many species cannot cross.21 The Bay’s freshwater tributaries, salinity structure, and tidal flow are additionally highly variable.22
The process of trying to understand how stressors like pollutants behave in an estuarine system, like the Bay, is greatly complicated by the phenomenon of positive feedback loops. These
“complex, circuitous paths”23 are common in fluctuating systems
like estuaries. A positive feedback loop occurs when the consequences of an ongoing process become factors in modifying or
changing that process by reinforcing and amplifying it.24 For example, the process of nutrification, which involves algal blooms
that block sunlight from underwater grasses, causing the grasses
and algae to die, sets off three positive feedback loops that reinforce and amplify the original process, leading to more die-off.25
The effects of positive feedback loops, which act to speed up the
original process, are negative because they can destabilize a system; in some cases, they even cause the system’s collapse. Reversing the flow of a feedback loop will not allow the component parts
of a complex, adaptive system like an estuary “simply to retrace
their steps”26 and to return to where the process started. Rather
when the process is reversed, “[n]ew feedback loops may emerge,
the old ones may change strength or direction, and new possibilities for the system open up.”27
Complex systems like estuaries also react to change in unpredictable ways. The smallest changes to such systems can have
wide-ranging effects.28 This is especially true “in far-fromequilibrium conditions,” such as those found in the Bay, where
even the smallest disturbances or changes “can become amplified
into gigantic, structure-breaking waves.”29 In fact, “the more complex a system is, the more numerous are the types of fluctuations

21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 13.
23. J. B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How
to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
933, 948 (1997).
24. Id. (stating “[s]uch feedback loops can become exponential in effect and thus dominate the system in which they operate.”).
25. See Babcock, supra note 5, at 10-12 (discussing this phenomenon).
26. Ruhl, supra note 23, at 948.
27. Id.
28. This is best illustrated by the “butterfly effect,” in which the smallest change, like
the wings of a butterfly “stirring the air today in a Chinese park can transform the storm
systems appearing next month over a North American city.” DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S
ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS 407 (Donald Worster & Alfred Crosby eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994) (1977) (explaining how “tiny differences in input might
quickly become substantial differences in output.”).
29. Alvin Toffler, Introduction to ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT
OF CHAOS: MAN’S NEW DIALOGUE WITH NATURE xvii (Bantam Books 1984).
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that threaten its stability.”30 Ecosystems contain constantly fluctuating subsystems. These fluctuations, either alone or in combination, may become sufficiently powerful as a result of positive
feedback loops to shatter the system’s preexisting organization.31
This makes it impossible to predict the direction change will take,
let alone whether the basic structure of the system will “disintegrate into ‘chaos’ or leap to a new, more differentiated, higher level
of ‘order’ or organization.”32 It also makes it difficult to discern
what the initial condition of the system was before the
change occurred.33
Additionally, our understanding of how complex systems, like
estuaries, behave is in flux. The common view fifty years ago was
all ecosystems were moving towards homeostasis: the point at
which the system was in perfect balance.34 Nature was seen as a
“manageable system of simple, linear, rational order.”35 Today,
ecologists view ecosystems as anything but stable; instead they are
seen as being composed of constantly “shifting patterns in endless
flux[.]”36 There are too many variables in these systems for scientists “to plot all the lines of influence, of cause and effect[,]” because nature’s processes are “essentially non-linear.”37 Where ecologists once believed they could determine what level of disturbance
was safe, today’s ecologists see “[e]ach organic system . . . [to be] so
rich in feedbacks, homeostatic devices, and potential multiple
pathways that a complete description is quite impossible.”38
The current standing paradigm assumes a natural system that
is stable and unchanging, where harms can be isolated and particularized to individual plaintiffs. However, this understanding is
seriously out-dated. It is now understood that natural systems,
like estuaries, are stochastic and unstable and subject to the laws
of complexity or chaos theory, where change, which can be set off
by the smallest disturbances to these systems, is one of the few
immutable rules, and phenomena like positive feedback loops can
both reinforce and alter outcomes.
30. ILYA PRIGOGINE & ISABELLE STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: MAN’S NEW DIBooks 1984).
31. Toffler, supra note 29, at xv.
32. Id.
33. STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE: THE SEARCH FOR THE LAWS OF
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND COMPLEXITY 23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
34. WORSTER, supra note 28, at 366-67 (stating “the principle goal of the theory of
ecosystem management was to achieve a ‘steady state,’ or equilibrium.”).
35. Id. at 406.
36. Id. at 412.
37. Id. at 407.
38. ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND
INHERITANCE 59 (1982).
ALOGUE WITH NATURE 188 (Bantam
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The complexity of the Bay’s structure also means a piecemeal
approach to solving its problems, one discharge pipe or septic system at a time, will not work. The attack on these problems needs
to be broad-based and systemic, like the environmentalists’ lawsuit
against EPA for failing to meet the Chesapeake Bay Agreement’s
water quality goals. Furthermore, unless the courts act, the multiplicity of political jurisdictions contribute to the Bay’s problems
and are responsible for their solution, making it highly unlikely
any one of these stakeholders will suddenly voluntarily step forward to rescue the Bay.39 They have not done so in over twenty
years, and there is no reason to believe they will do so now.40
The complexity of natural systems like estuaries thus
creates a serious barrier to showing a particularized injury, which
requires disaggregating isolated harms to the system. If individual
harms cannot be isolated, then a prospective plaintiff cannot identify a discrete harm that has injured her. If, for example, scientists
cannot untangle the relationship between nutrient loading and
general water quality in the Bay, then how can a plaintiff show
whether her injury from the Bay’s excess nutrient loadings is from
the contribution of nutrients from upstream tributaries, the failure
of the state to control leaking septic systems, the reluctance of
dairy farmers to implement manure management controls, or from
airborne deposition of nitrogen, let alone from a particular source?
Yet, these are exactly the showings that are required under the
Court’s current standing doctrine, which is discussed next.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT STANDING JURISPRUDENCE
Standing is the hurdle all plaintiffs must surmount before a
federal court will hear the merits of their claims.41 The elements of
the Court’s standing doctrine are sufficiently well known that most
law students can recite them from memory: “[t]he plaintiff must
39. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2003) (stating that when there is a mismatch between
the underlying “social ills” and the existing political-legal regime, it is highly unlikely that
any regulator or other interested party will step forward and try to solve the problem).
40. See Id. at 36 (explaining that regulators and “those benefiting from the status
quo” have little incentive to change it because they “have sunk money and effort” into maintaining it and “are likely to become attached to it”).
41. See generally Randall S. Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 121 (2008); Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L.
REV. 221 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, A Place-Based Theory of Standing, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1505 (2008); Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA, 23
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73 (2008); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury
to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); David M. Palmer, Untangling Tenth Amendment Standing: Why Private Parties Cannot Enforce the Federal Structure, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 169 (2008).
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have suffered an ‘injury-in fact,’” defined as “an invasion of a legally protected interest, which is (a) concrete and particularized, [citations omitted]; and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’ [citations omitted].”42 The injury must also be fairly
traceable to the defendant’s challenged action and not “th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court[,]” and “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”43 The doctrine is
not set out in the Constitution; rather it is inferred from Article
III’s cases and controversies limitation on judicial authority44 to
assure plaintiffs have a genuine interest and personal stake in
a controversy. Additional common justifications given for the
standing doctrine are separation of powers, judicial economy,
and fairness.45
The judicial requirement that a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate she has suffered an injury-in-fact is at the core of the
standing doctrine. The additional adjectival requirements that the
injury be “concrete” or reflect “a personal stake” in the underlying
action and be actual or imminent exist to “assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination[.]”46 The other two
prongs of the Court’s standing doctrine, traceability and redressability, flow from these requirements.
A. The Need to Show a Particularized Injury
Standing has been problematic for many environmental plaintiffs because often the harms complained about cannot easily be
reduced to a judicially cognizable injury-in-fact, which can then be
traced to illegal governmental conduct and be redressed by a fa-

42. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
43. Id.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (extends judicial review “to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . .
[and] to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party[.]”)
45. Palmer, supra note 41, at 177.
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“[The] requirement [of concrete injury] is not just an empty formality. It
preserves the vitality of the adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the outcome, and that ‘the legal questions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action.’”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998) (theoretical harms should be addressed by the political process, not the judicial process, to “prevent[ ] a plaintiff from obtaining . . . an advisory opinion.”).
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vorable court decision.47 Another confounding feature of the standing doctrine is that environmental harms frequently affect the
commons, in which “few, if any, have distinct and particularized
legal interests.”48
This article focuses on the need for an injury to be particularized to an individual plaintiff, and thus distinguishable from injuries suffered by other members of the public, because in many
ways it can be the most problematic of the adjectives adorning the
Court’s modern standing jurisprudence for environmental plaintiffs.49 The need to particularize injuries to a discrete plaintiff
leads to a scramble by plaintiffs’ lawyers to find individuals with a
personal connection to the harm complained about, thus reducing
the Court’s standing doctrine to what Chief Justice Roberts referred to in Massachusetts as a “lawyer’s game.”50 The absurdity of
this situation, as Professor Daniel Farber notes, is that while the
government’s “regulatory actions will often create the requisite injury in fact . . . in a given case an environmental organization may
not be able to recruit the appropriate plaintiff” or the plaintiff’s
burden will not be met because she has filed the wrong affidavits.51
The Court’s insistence that plaintiffs demonstrate a particularized injury makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to bring a
legal action to address the Bay’s broad-based problems. The plaintiffs cannot show the requisite particularized injury because the
cause of their injury cannot be neatly unraveled into discrete problems. The indeterminacy and nonlinear character of the natural
system described earlier preclude the identification of particularized injuries. If these injuries cannot be particularized, then in
the parlance of the standing doctrine this makes them generalized
injuries, which are broadly felt by an undifferentiated regional
or even national population and thus barred by the Court’s
standing doctrine.52
47. Jonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of Powers After Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REV. 175,
181-82 (2008).
48. Id. at 182.
49. This is not to say that the other elements of injury-in-fact or the two other constitutionally mandated prongs, traceability and redressability, are problem-free. The need to
demonstrate that an injury is imminent drew Justice Scalia’s attention in Summers v.
Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1150 (2009), where he criticized the affidavit filed by
one environmental plaintiff because it discussed “past injury rather than imminent future
injury that is sought to be enjoined.”
50. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
51. Farber, supra note 41, at 1542.
52. There is a distinction between widespread harms, which do not defeat the standing of an individual experiencing the same harm (see United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973) (explaining that “standing is not
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury” because that “would mean
that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody[
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife53 remains the Court’s strongest
affirmation of the need to show a particularized injury.54 While
Massachusetts rectified some of the more extreme elements of Justice Scalia’s standing analysis in Lujan, the opinion did not eliminate the need for the harm to be one that directly affects the particular plaintiff.55 Indeed, the Court went to great lengths to show
Massachusetts suffered a specific injury from global climate
change–the loss of its coastline.56
In Lujan, Justice Scalia emphatically states a particularized
injury-in-fact is part of the “irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing” and, therefore, cannot be modified.57 Justice Scalia is
wrong for two reasons. First, even if particularized injury is constitutionally mandated, the Court has relaxed other elements of its
standing requirements, as shown below, and there is no reason not
to loosen this one as well. Second, the particularized injury requirement is prudential, as is mootness, the political question doctrine, and the bar against third-party standing, and thus not constitutionally required.
B. Reasons to Relax the Particularized Injury Showing,
Especially for Complex Evolving Ecosystems
First, if Justice Scalia is right, and particularized injury is
constitutionally required, then it is hard to countenance the
Court’s relaxed attitude toward the other elements of standing
without including the need for an injury to be particularized. For
]”)), and generalized harms where the plaintiff cannot distinguish her harm from that being
suffered by others. Id. at 689 (stating that plaintiffs must have alleged “a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural
resources that were claimed to be affected.”).
53. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
54. Whether Summers will challenge Lujan for that title is open to question. See
Noelle Straub, Experts Weigh Impact of High Court’s Forest Service Ruling, GREENWIRE,
Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2009/03/04/2. According to Professor
Robert Fischman:
It’s hard to know with this case [Summers] whether it represents a departure
from what had been a broadening of standing over the last 10 years or whether
this is going to be an anomaly . . . The standing aspect to the ruling just touches
on so many topics and so much litigation that even though it’s not quite clear what
it means, it’s of critical importance to hundreds of plaintiffs around the country.
Id.
55. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (explaining that “it is clear that petitioners’
submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards
of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’” (citing Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560)).
56. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 (“Because the Commonwealth ‘owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,’ . . . it has alleged a particularized injury in
its capacity as a landowner.”) (internal citations omitted).
57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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example, the Court has substantially lessened the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate traceability and redressability when prosecuting some procedural right granted by Congress,58 like the right to
require an agency to prepare an environmental impact statement
under the National Environmental Policy Act. In Massachusetts,
the Court relaxed the need that an injury be imminent until the
next century or longer.59 In Bennett v. Spear,60 the Court displayed
a similarly relaxed attitude toward the zone-of-interest test, which
was engrafted onto the injury-in-fact requirement in the last quarter of the previous century,61 relaxing it in the context of a statutory citizen suit provision.
If the Constitution mandates these standing requirements,
then the Court must apply them to all injuries under all circumstances. Any exception based on a procedural or some other right
appears more like “a creature of practical necessity” than constitutional dogma and reveals the test’s “fundamental ineptitude . . . as
a reasonable measure of constitutional standing in public law cases.”62 Like the Pillsbury dough boy, the contours of the standing
doctrine, including its most hallowed injury-in-fact component, appear infinitely malleable. If the Court can loosen these standing
elements, then surely it can treat the requirement that an injury
be particularized the same way. Loosening the particularized injury test will hardly open the floodgates to litigation, considering
that the concrete injury requirement adequately cabined the
Court’s jurisdiction for years before the particularized requirement
came into vogue.
The second reason for the belief that the Court can relax the
particularized injury test is that the obverse of a particularized
injury is a generalized one,63 and courts have long considered the
bar against generalized injuries to be prudential.64 Because the bar
58. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 517-18; cf. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129
S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (“Only a ‘person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect
his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy.’ . . . Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury
in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.”)..
59. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522-23.
60. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (saying that the “ESA’s citizen-suit
provision . . . expands the zone of interests[ ].”).
61. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (a person has standing if her interest is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute[.]”).
62. Brown, supra note 41, at 263-64.
63. A typical example of a generalized injury is a taxpayer suit where the injury suffered in the allegation is often minute and shared with millions of others, is indeterminable,
and is a reflection of a public, not individual, concern. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Mass. v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
64. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (identifying the generalized grievance bar as a prudential barrier).
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against pleading generalized injuries is prudential, courts can and
have relaxed it. Jonathan R. Nash identifies two such instances.65
The first involves the “[o]verbreadth doctrine,” which allows parties to object to overbroad speech regulations, even when the regulations do not infringe directly on their speech.66 The second example Nash gives is a declaratory judgment where courts can declare
broadly the rights and legal relations of any party seeking such
relief regardless of whether the party has personally experienced
the effect of the threatened action.67 In each instance, plaintiffs are
raising broad-based public concerns; in neither case is the injury
particularized to the plaintiff, nor will the effects of a positive ruling from the court be limited to redressing just the injury to the
particular plaintiff.
The reason for barring generalized grievances is the same reason for requiring particularized injuries–to prevent courts from
breaching the barrier between the judicial branch and the other
two branches of government.68 However, in the situation which has
given rise to this article, that reason does not make sense. Precisely because harms to complex natural systems like the Bay are
widespread and shared by many, it is unlikely that the public will
organize to pressure the government to abate them.69 Moreover,
neither the government nor the public responds well to “ex ante”
catastrophic risks, where the benefits of expenditures before the
catastrophic event occurs appear less tangible than the present
day costs of taking action to avert it.70 These social dynamics become barriers to action, a dynamic afflicting the Bay, and allow the
political branches of government to avoid acting. Lastly, the political branches are not powerless to act before a court reaches the
merits of a case and can thus preempt the lawsuit at any time before it must step in and resolve the dispute.
Unless courts are willing to set aside the requirement that
plaintiffs plead a particularized injury in the case of harms to
complex natural systems like estuaries, and fill the vacuum left by
the elected branches, those harms will continue unabated and, in
the case of the Bay, will potentially magnify and become worse. If
65. Jonathan R. Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
494, 518-19 (2008).
66. Id. at 518.
67. Id. at 518-19.
68. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 33 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining the
bar against generalized grievances as preventing “‘something in the nature of an Athenian
democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts’”).
69. See Buzbee, supra note 39, at 28-29 (discussing how people faced with harm to a
common pool resource are unlikely to take any initiative to protect it).
70. Nash, supra note 65, at 520.
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one agrees that the particularized injury requirement is prudential, or at least capable of modification like the other elements of
standing, then it should be apparent that the Court can abandon
or modify it in some situations.71 However, no court is likely to abandon or modify the requirement without some limiting principles
to curb the number and type of potential plaintiffs who might otherwise flood the courts.
IV. SOME PROPOSED LIMITING PRINCIPLES TO CONSTRAIN THE
NUMBER AND TYPES OF CASES UNDER A MORE RELAXED
INJURY-IN-FACT STANDARD
In the final part of this article, four limiting principles are proposed for consideration.
The first principle limits the type of plaintiff who can qualify
for a waiver of the need to show a particularized injury.72 This
principle is similar to the Court’s prudential third party standing
jurisprudence, where parties have sometimes been allowed to raise
the concerns of others not before the court when the litigation
would impact those other parties.73 One type of plaintiff who would
qualify under this principle is someone who satisfies Daniel A.
Farber’s place-based standing requirement.74 Place-based standing
is the idea that plaintiffs with a special connection to the geographic area they are concerned about are uniquely qualified to
prosecute matters affecting that area.75 Thus, the eponymous Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which is dedicated to the restoration and
71. But, unlike the Court in Massachusetts, the author sees no reason to limit this
proposed relaxation of the Court’s standing doctrine to states. The unusual vehemence and
breadth of the Chief Justice’s attack on the majority’s analysis, including noting that there
was no basis in the Court’s standing jurisprudence to carve out states for “special solicitude”
raises at least the possibility that the dissenters envision the effect of the majority’s standing analysis to have a much broader impact than just on state plaintiffs. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536-37 (2007). In a subsequent article, these and other reasons why the
opinion should be applied more broadly will be developed.
72. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of
Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655 (1998) (exploring the complexities of expanding
standing as a way of enforcing the duties of charitable trusts and examining alternatives to
doing that).
73. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (stating that a bartender was “entitled to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that would be ‘diluted or adversely
affected’ should her constitutional challenge fail and the statutes remain in force.”). But see
Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (denying standing to a doctor who challenged a statute on the ground that it would deprive plaintiffs of their lives without due process).
74. See generally Farber, supra note 41. While Farber proposes replacing the injuryin-fact test with a place-based theory of standing, it is merely suggested here as a limiting
principle for allowing some generalized claims of injury.
75. Id. at 1549 (stating that place-based standing recognizes that “humans are intimately and deeply connected with their geographic surroundings, and therefore have
legitimate cause for complaint about environmental violations that impact
those surroundings.").
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protection of the Chesapeake Bay and devotes all of its resources
and energies to that end, should be able to establish a concrete
physical connection to the Bay. Even though the broader public in
the Bay’s watershed may share the Foundation’s interest in a
healthy Bay, the Foundation’s concrete connection to the Bay
makes its harm from the Bay’s decline “more than the abstract
injury to ideology that the Court has consistently rejected
as nonjusticiable.”76
Another type of plaintiff who would not need to make a showing of particularized injury would be an organization that possesses the commitment, expertise, agenda, and resources to prosecute the matter. For example, the National Audubon Society qualifies by each of these metrics to protect critically important bird
habitats like the Rainwater Basin in Nebraska or the Prairie Pothole region of North Dakota, even though the organization may
not be physically proximate to the resource. The principle recognizes that only such groups have the expertise and resources necessary to contribute meaningfully to such litigation. This plaintiff
finds its origins in Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton, where he argued for an “imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in order to enable an organization . . .
[with] pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and
purposes in the area of the environment” to have standing to litigate environmental issues.77 It is narrower, however, than Justice
Douglas’ proposal, which would grant standing to speak for a natural resource, like a river, to anyone if she enjoyed some attribute
of it.78
The second limiting principle focuses on the nature and importance of the resource that is the subject of litigation and on the
failure of the elected branches of government to protect it. The
elimination of the particularized injury requirement would only
extend to litigation involving large, nationally or regionally important ecosystems, like the Bay, the Everglades, or a migratory bird
flyway, where the effect of government inaction risks catastrophic
and/or irreversible harm.79 Thus, not every lawsuit would justify
elimination of the particularized injury test, but only those involv-

76. Brown, supra note 41, at 277.
77. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water–whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a
logger–must be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are
threatened with destruction.”).
79. See Toffler, supra note 29, at xvii (describing how sometimes the smallest of
disturbances can lead to wide systemic changes and even their collapse or
complete restructuring).
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ing resources of “unusual importance,”80 where the impacts are
“diffuse, with effects that are insidious and imperceptible but dangerously irreversible[,]”81 and where the elected branches of
government have failed to act, as in the case of the Bay, or
acted improperly.
The third principle addresses the type of harm the litigation is
trying to arrest or abate. Relief from the need to demonstrate a
particularized injury would only be allowed when the lawsuit addresses broad-based systemic harms to those resources, from
which discrete harms cannot be isolated. Lawsuits to protect severable parts of these areas, like a specific wetland, would continue to be subject to a particularized injury standard, in part because the showing could be made.82 The same would go for suits
filed against individual violators of various environmental laws,
even if the violation involves a much larger resource, so long as the
claim did not rest on disaggregating an individual injury from a
much larger systemic harm.
Both the second and third principles address situations in
which, consistent with the concept of separation of powers, the
judicial branch is expected to step in and correct a situation where
the executive branch has failed to implement a directive from the
legislative branch to the detriment of the people. In neither case
are courts being asked to develop programs to protect these systems, as they clearly lack the competence to do this. Rather, courts
are being asked to interpret whether existing law requires some
form of government action–“a question eminently suitable to resolution in federal court.”83

80. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 506 (2007). This principle elicited the most
comments from Florida State University College of Law faculty after my lecture, illustrating
a justifiable level of concern about the vagueness of the proposal and its capacity for abuse.
Several of these comments suggested ways in which the proposal could become less vague,
such as proposing that resources of importance be identified through a process similar to the
listing of wetlands of international significance under Ramsar or by having plaintiffs demonstrate the significance of the resource and the failure of the government to protect it.
Either of these might work, so long as they do not add to the burden plaintiffs already bear
to meet the remaining standing prongs. A possible way to identify important resources that
would avoid increasing plaintiffs’ burden is to include in the principle only those resources
the importance of which Congress has recognized directly, such as through the Great Lakes
Program in section 118 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 126, or through the National
Estuary Program under section 320 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1330. Developing
any of these ideas further, however, is beyond the scope of this article and must be saved for
another day.
81. Brown, supra note 41, at 279-80.
82. The author is not arguing here that these more confined lawsuits, such as suits to
stop the filling of a wetland or to stop an unpermitted discharger, should not be brought.
The author is only asserting that, by themselves, they cannot address the systemic problems
of larger resources.
83. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516.

Fall, 2009]

PARTICULARIZED INJURY

17

The final limiting principle derives from the means by which a
plaintiff seeks relief from a court. Under this principle, waivers of
the particularized injury test would be restricted to claims brought
under statutory citizen suit authority.84 This proposal piggybacks
on the majority’s reasoning in Massachusetts that when Congress
has authorized the filing of a legal action to protect some right or
entitlement, some elements of injury-in-fact can be relaxed.85 That
reasoning is simply extended to the need to show a particularized
injury. One reason for this approach is that citizen suit provisions
contain their own limiting principles, offering additional constraints on the number and type of suits that can be brought.86 For
example, plaintiffs can only sue a federal agency for some failure
to perform a mandatory duty when their claim has not been
preempted by subsequent agency action, where the plaintiffs have
complied with various jurisdictional prerequisites, and where the
violation is ongoing.
There is a risk that the factual burden of meeting these limiting principles, especially the first one, could be as onerous as what
plaintiffs currently face under the particularized injury requirement; however a simple declaration will be all that is necessary to
establish either the specific place-based connection or the organizational qualifications to prosecute the matter. There is also a risk
that the nature of the litigation, compelling agency action unreasonably withheld, invites the courts into micromanaging agency
behavior. But courts do this every time they put an agency on a
compliance schedule for failing to meet some mandatory duty, or,
as the Court did in Massachusetts, demand that an agency give a
reasoned explanation for its inaction.

84. This limitation means that place-based or otherwise qualified groups suing to protect some resource from harm under the many natural resources and public land laws, such
as the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et. seq., or the Federal Land Policy & Management
Act 43 U.S.C. §1701 et. seq., which contain no citizen suit provisions, would still have to
show particularized injury.
85. There seems to be some disagreement among the Justices in Summers over the
extent to which Congress can loosen the constitutionally mandated standing prongs. See
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (stating that Congress “can
loosen the strictures of the redressability prong[,]” but not the requirement to show a concrete injury); Id. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting that the “case would present
different considerations if Congress had sought to provide redress for a concrete injury” and
had identified or conferred “some interest separate and apart from a procedural right,”
where no case or controversy had existed before); Id. at 1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing a hypothetical statute which expressly permits environmental groups to bring cases
like the one before the court, and saying that since “[t]he majority cannot, and does not,
claim that such a statute would be unconstitutional[,] . . . [h]ow then can it find the present
case constitutionally unauthorized?”).
86. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2008) (precluding citizen suits where plaintiffs have
failed to file a 60-day notice letter or where the government has already initiated an enforcement action against the alleged violator).
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There is another risk, however, that is more serious. By continuing to demand “particularized proof” of a plaintiff’s injury, the
Court guarantees the judicial branch will not fill the gap left by
the other two branches when it comes to protecting fragile and
complex ecosystems from broad-based systemic harms. Private litigation to stem the loss of biodiversity at a regional, let alone national or global, level, such as the disappearance of Neotropical
birds from North American flyways and the plunge in stocks of
straddling fish, will fail. Instead, environmental plaintiffs will be
restricted to discrete, less effective challenges to individual permit
violations or to government actions that affect some small part of a
larger ecosystem.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Massachusetts’s Court’s sophisticated understanding of how complex natural systems work and how human interactions with them can have diffuse, often delayed, impacts, Massachusetts illustrates the tenacity of the particularized injury test.
The lengths to which the majority went to find a particularized
harm to Massachusetts from global climate change underscores
the poverty of the requirement, making the Court’s effort seem
like a return to what Blackmun feared in Lujan–“codepleading formalism.”87
It seems that the Court needs a way out of the box in which
Justice Scalia has placed it.88 This article has tried to respond to
this need by suggesting why the particularized injury requirement
should be loosened in certain limited situations. In support of this
idea, the features of large, complex natural systems, like the Chesapeake Bay, that make it impossible for plaintiffs to show a particularized injury have been identified. The author has argued that
the Court has had a relaxed attitude towards various elements of
the standing doctrine, and therefore the need to show a particularized injury could as well be relaxed because it is more akin to the
prudential standing doctrine than to a strict constitutional requirement. The author recognizes that this proposal, should it be
taken up by any litigant, has an extremely low chance of success
on the current Court. Nonetheless, the risk of trying and failing
are more than offset by the environmental harm of continuing the
status quo.
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 593 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
88. The continuing divisiveness on the Court over the contours of the standing doctrine and its use to block consideration of the merits of certain controversies, as illustrated
most recently by Summers, seems proof positive of this conclusion.

